Journal Facts

Journal
Journal of Collective Negotiations
ISSN
2167-7816 (print) 2167-7824 (electronic)
Volume
31
Issue
1
Date
7/1/2006

Article Facts

Title
LABOR NEGOTIATIONS AND GAME THEORY: THE CASE OF ASYMMETRIC BARGAINING POWER
DOI
10.2190/3451-2NJM-VGE6-EN7C
Author
LAWRENCE J. HABER
Pages
21-32
Online Date
07/27/2006

Article Links

LABOR NEGOTIATIONS AND GAME THEORY: THE CASE OF ASYMMETRIC BARGAINING POWER

LAWRENCE J. HABER

DOI: 10.2190/3451-2NJM-VGE6-EN7C

Abstract

Recent labor negotiations suggest that game-theory models can be used to analyze a wide range of labor relations situations. This article presents examples of how the Prisoner's Dilemma game can be extended to highlight the incentives present in many contract negotiations, including sports. Examples are the successful asymmetric bargaining power applied to the Major League Baseball Players Association contract talks in 2002, and the problem-filled National Hockey League Players Association negotiations of 2004, which are likened to a game of Chicken, and in which it was unclear whether one side held an advantage over the other.

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