THE ISRAELI PHYSICIANS' STRIKE: AN INEVITABLE OUTCOME OF THE STRUCTURE OF ISRAEL'S HEATH CARE SYSTEM
YAEL BENJAMINI, AMIRAM GAFNI, AND JOEL BLANKETT
DOI: 10.2190/74QT-RUBN-F4F4-AU81
Abstract
On March 2, 1983, the longest physicians' strike (118 days) in the history of the nation began in Israel. This article presents an economic explanation for the strike: The strike was an inevitable outcome of the specific structure of the Israeli health care market, which is characterized by a bilateral monopoly relation between doctors and their public sector employers, and an excess supply of physicians who are either unable to create more demand for their services or who are unable to benefit from the demand created by them. The strike failed to change any of the important features of the market that letd to this strike. Thus, a second strike is still an option, because political constraints prevent any change taking place in the bilateral monopoly market in the foreseeable future. A possible solution, physician manpower planning, is described here.
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